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Abstract
We  examine  the  effect  of  commuting  on  labour  supply  patterns.  A  labour  supply  model is
introduced which shows that commuting distance increases daily workhours, whereas the effect
on total labour supply is ambiguous. This paper addresses these issues empirically using the
socio-economic panel data for Germany between 1997 and 2007. Endogeneity of commuting
distance is accounted for by using employer-induced changes in commuting distance. In line
with the theoretical model developed, we find that commuting distance has a slight positive
effect on daily workhours. Further, we find a similar effect on weekly labour supply, but no effect
on workdays. Distinguishing between males and females, it appears that the effects on labour
supply are mainly through the behaviour of females, but the effects for females are still small.
Keywords: Commuting, congestion tax, labour supply
JEL codes: J22, R412
1. Introduction
In the current paper, we focus on the effect of commuting on labour supply patterns, including
workhours, workdays and weekly labour supply. There are a number of reasons why this topic is
of interest to economists. One reason is that there are divergent theoretical views on this effect
(e.g. Cogan, 1981; Parry and Bento, 2001). This is related to different assumptions regarding the
relevant behavioural margins. In one literature, it is assumed that the number of workdays is
chosen and the number of workhours per day is fixed, whereas in another literature, opposite
assumptions  are  made.  When  examining  the  effect  of  commuting,  it  turns  out  that  these
assumptions  generate  different  predictions about  the  relationship  between  labour  supply  and
commuting.
The second reason is related to policy: there are a range of arguments (mainly congestion
and agglomeration externalities) why governments use policies that tax or subsidize commuting
(De Borger and van Dender, 2003; Borck and Wrede, 2008; 2009; Hymel, 2009). A relevant
question  is  then  how  these  policies  affect  labour  supply  patterns,  which  depend  on  the
relationship between commuting and labour supply. In addition, there is a substantial literature
on government regulation of housing construction (Saks, 2008). It is then important to know
whether increases in commuting distance due to government regulation also have (negative)
effects on labour supply.
A third reason is that it may help us to understand long-run developments in working
patterns and commuting (see also Van Ommeren and Rietveld, 2005). For example, it has been
well documented that the increase in the spread of workers’ starting time is closely related to the
phenomenon  of  peak  congestion,  mainly  caused  by  commuters  (Henderson,  1981;  Wilson,
1988). Similarly, it may be thought that any increase in commuting costs (e.g. due to congestion)
encourages workers to increase daily workhours and decrease number of workdays. If true, then
this is another good example of how commuting causes changes in working patterns (see also
Baum, 2009).3
A fourth reason is that the textbook analysis of congestion pricing implies that the welfare
in the economy does not depend on how the revenue of the road tax is redistributed into the
economy  (see  e.g. Small  and  Verhoef,  2007,  p. 120). This  result  is  obtained  under  the
assumption that the demand and supply of transport is not distorted by other taxes. In case of
commuting  however,  it seems more reasonable  to  assume  that  labour  supply  is negatively
distorted by an income tax (e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Parry and Bento, 2001; Mayeres
and Proost, 2001; Calthrop, 2001). In this case, a road tax may even have a negative effect on
welfare (Parry and Bento, 2001). One of the main consequences is that to increase welfare in the
economy, the revenues of road pricing should be used to reduce the level of the distortionary
income taxes (Parry and Bento, 2001). Therefore, the relevant empirical question is whether
labour supply is indeed reduced by a road tax. We do not observe road taxes in most parts of the
world but one may examine how an increase in commuting distance affects labour supply, which
gives insight into the effect of a road tax on labour supply.
The empirical literature in economics that deals with the relationship between commuting
behaviour  and  the  workers’  labour  supply  is  closely  related  to  the  theoretical  literature.
Theoretical  urban  models  essentially  assume  that  the  residence  location  is  endogenous (e.g.
Wales, 1978; White, 1988), whereas labour models assume that it is given (e.g. Gubits, 2004).
1
In the theoretical section, we keep residence location given in the spirit of labour economics
models, and we consider exogenous changes in the commuting distance. In the empirical section,
we deal with the endogeneity of commuting distance.
To understand the effect of exogenous changes in commuting costs on changes in labour
supply, it is useful to examine the work by labour economists who focus on the optimal setting
of number of workhours for workers. Although it is common that theoretical and empirical
research focuses on one measure of labour supply (e.g. hours per week), only few studies have
1 Urban models assume that commuting distance is optimally chosen based on an optimal choice of the residence
taking (endogenously  determined) house  prices  into account, so that workers are fully  compensated for longer
commutes by lower house prices. Static labour models usually assume that the number of workhours is optimally
chosen given the commuting distance and wage.4
focused on more flexible specifications of labour supply patterns (e.g. working weeks per year
and working hours per week; see e.g. Hanoch, 1980, p. 119; Blank, 1988). One important issue is
then the presence of fixed costs of work, such as commuting costs, which are costs that are not
related to the amount of labour supplied. Cogan (1981) establishes that when fixed costs are
present, the period of time over which the fixed costs are incurred is the ideal measure of labour
supply. That is, if fixed costs are per day, such as daily commuting costs, and these daily costs
are  important,  then  the  appropriate  measure  of labour  supply is  daily  labour  supply.  Cogan
(1981), as a response to the seminal paper by Heckman (1980), examines the effect of labour
costs on labour supply. Although theoretically he cannot provide an answer whether this effect is
positive or negative, empirically he concludes that increases in daily fixed costs of work reduce
labour  supply,  at  least  for  the  sample  of  women  that  he  analyses. Cogan  (1981),  and
subsequently textbooks in labour economics (e.g. Ehrenberg and Smith, 2003), assume that the
number of workhours is optimally chosen given the commuting distance, which implies that
labour supply is optimally chosen per day.
2 This literature indicates that both daily workhours
and total labour supply decline with an increase in commuting time, but increase with an increase
in monetary commuting costs (see e.g. Manning, 2003; Gubits, 2004).
In  contrast,  Parry  and  Bento  (2001)  make  the  opposite  assumption  by  assuming  that
workers  optimally  choose  their number  of  workdays,  whereas  daily  hours  are  fixed. This
assumption is nowadays standard in the transport literature on labour supply and commuting
(e.g. Calthrop, 2001). The number of workdays per week determines then the total commuted
distance per week (the distance between the residence and the workplace times the number of
workdays). Consequently, there is a strict complementarity between the commuted distance per
week  and  total  labour  supply.
3  This  assumption  simplifies  the  analysis  of  the  effect  of
2 In this literature, slightly confusingly, it is not discussed explicitly whether labour supply is per day or per week,
but since commuting costs are considered fixed, labour supply must be per day. This literature then shows that
workers optimally choose a minimum but positive number of daily hours.
3 With strict complementarity we mean that a change in labour supply implies a proportional change in the distance
travelled (e.g. per week). See also Wuyts (2009) who allows for telecommuting and therefore does not assume
complementarity.5
commuting costs on labour supply, but implies that, conditional on the choice of transport mode,
given an  increase  in  commuting  costs workers  may only  adapt  their  commuting  costs  by
adapting total labour supply.
4 The model implies then that commuting time decreases number of
workdays as well as total labour supply, whereas the effect of monetary commuting costs on
these  variables is  ambiguous.  Based  on  assumptions  regarding  the  size  of  the  income  and
substitution effects, the authors presume that if monetary costs increase, total labour supply
decreases.
5
Arguably, workers have other behavioural margins than a reduction in labour supply to
reduce their commuting costs.
6 We will discuss here three relevant behavioural margins that are
discussed in the literature. First, workers have quite some flexibility with respect to the chosen
workhours (see e.g. Arnott, 2005, p. 135). Particularly in congested areas, workers may leave
earlier, or later, from home, in order to avoid peak hours (Arnott et al., 1993). Second, workers
may change commuting costs by moving residence (Gubits, 2004). Third, and this will be the
focus of the current paper, workers have the option to increase the number of hours worked per
day  and,  maybe  simultaneously,  decrease  the  number  of  workdays.  As  already  noted  by
Hamermesh (1996) for Germany, the variation in daily hours is slightly larger than the variation
in days, suggesting that this mechanism is important. Hence, in a more general setting than
usually assumed, the effect of an increase in commuting costs (e.g. induced by a road tax) on
total labour supply may be negligibly small, or, as we will see, even positive.
As  far  as  we are  aware,  this  is  the  first study  that distinguishes theoretically  and
empirically between number of workdays and daily labour supply. In the theoretical model, it is
assumed that both daily hours and number of workdays (e.g. per week) are optimally chosen by
4 Given this assumption, in order to measure the effect of commuting costs on labour supply, it is reasonable to
employ empirical labour supply elasticities that are based on the estimated relationship between labour supply and
wages (see e.g. Parry and Bento, 2001). If this assumption does not hold, then to employ these elasticities may be
incorrect.
5 It is then intuitive that a road tax that increases commuting costs may reduce welfare given the presence of a
distortionary income tax. Recycling the road-tax revenues by reducing the levels of income tax will then increase
welfare (as demonstrated by Parry and Bento, 2001)
6  So,  the  revenue-recycling  argument  may  not  hold  in  a  more  general  setting.  This  is  relevant  as  the  other
behavioural margins are not, or at least not systematically, distorted by the income tax.6
workers. Empirically, we observe commuting distance which is positively related to commuting
time and monetary costs. It is shown that both monetary and time commuting costs increase
daily hours. Hence, workers with longer commuting distances (and therefore longer commuting
times and higher monetary costs) will unambiguously increase daily workhours. Furthermore, it
is  shown  that  commuting time  reduces  workdays,  but  the  effect  of  commuting  costs  is
ambiguous.  The  effect  of  distance  on  workdays  is therefore ambiguous. These  effects of
commuting time and monetary commuting costs, and therefore distance, on total labour supply
are all ambiguous, as it is not clear a priori whether the effect on daily hours or workdays
dominates.
In the empirical section, we examine the effect of commuting distance on labour supply
patterns, distinguishing  between  total  labour,  daily  labour  supply  and number  of  workdays,
where daily labour supply is defined as the number of workhours per day (in empirical studies
known to us, labour supply is measured per week or even longer period, the main exception is
Hamermesh, 1996). We use the socio-economic panel data for Germany between 1997 and 2007.
One of the main issues we are concerned with is that commuting distance may be endogenous
with respect to labour supply patterns. We use therefore a worker first-differences approach and
employ an innovative approach where changes in commuting distance are employer-induced,
and therefore exogenous. This approach is not only useful in the context of labour supply, but
will be useful in many other applications where it is thought that distance is endogenous.
This is a relevant consideration because in the literature it is emphasized that it is difficult
to  find  instruments  for  commuting  distance  to  correct  for  possible  endogeneity  (see  e.g.
Manning, 2002; Gubits, 2004).
In  the  next  section,  we  discuss  the  theoretical  setting.  The  remainder  of  the  paper  is
structured  as  follows:  section  3  provides  information  on  the  data employed,  introduces  the
econometric model and presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.7
2. The Model
To explain the labour supply behaviour of employed individuals, we introduce a labour supply
model including commuting.
7 Hence, we assume a standard labour supply model by allowing for
commuting costs and by distinguishing between daily work time and number of workdays. For
an individual who participates in the labour market there are two essential decisions to be made
each period (e.g. defined by a week or a year): (i) how much work-time per day, H, and (ii) how
many days, D, she would like to work. So, total labour supply per period is defined by DH. The
number of days D and daily work time H are assumed to be continuous variables.
8 It is assumed
that the labour supply preferred by employed individuals can also be realized. Participation in the
labour market implies that DH > 0, so that H > 0 and D > 0. In line with the literature, we
assume that commuting involves time t and induces monetary commuting costs. The monetary
costs are proportional to distance k with a positive cost per kilometre c and are therefore equal to
kc. In our analysis, commuting speed is exogenously given (for an analysis with endogenous
speed, see for example, Van Ommeren and Fosgerau, 2009).
Suppose that workers derive utility from income Y and leisure time L, and that there are
only two possible uses of time: labour and leisure. The workers’ utility function v can then be
written as     0 , , v V Y w H D Dkc L DH Dt      where L  is the worker time endowment per
week (or maximum leisure time), Y0 is non-labour income and w(H) is the daily wage, which
depends  on  the  number  of daily hours  worked. So,   0 Y Y w H D Dkc    and
. L L DH Dt    We assume that the daily wage is increasing and concave in H. So, w'(H) > 0
and w''(H) < 0,  where w'(H) denotes the marginal effect of H on the wage. Concavity of the
daily wage can be justified when employers pay the worker’s marginal productivity and a worker
7 We ignore income taxes, which obviously affect the net wage, as well as road taxes, which directly affect the
monetary and indirectly the time costs of commuting (through reduced congestion). Introducing these taxes, as well
as government budget restrictions, is necessary for welfare analyses (Parry and Bento, 2001). In the current paper
however, we are mainly concerned with the effect of changes in commuting on labour supply, so we abstract from
taxation issues.
8 If the period is a year, it is clear that the number of days is continuous. If it is a week, then the assumption that the
number of days is continuous is still plausible if the worker is able to vary the number of days per week over time.
For example, let us suppose that an individual prefers to work 1.2 days per week. She will work one day per week
for a period of four weeks and the fifth week she will work two days.8
becomes less productive the more hours she works. The utility function v is assumed to be twice-
differentiable  and  concave  (so,  the  first  derivatives  are  positive,  the  second  derivatives  are
negative and the cross-derivatives are positive). This assumption is reasonable when income and
leisure are both normal goods. When DH > 0, then w(H) > kc, so participation in the labour
market implies that the daily wage exceeds the daily monetary commuting costs. It is assumed
that workers maximize their utility by choosing daily work time H and days D.
It can be shown that the optimally chosen daily work time is defined by (see Appendix A):
  '( ) ( ) . w H H t w H kc    (1)
This expression states that the worker’s marginal cost of working one day (so, the marginal
opportunity cost of leisure times the loss of leisure time) is equal to the daily wage net of
monetary commuting costs. Given (1), it follows that both monetary commuting costs kc and
commuting time t increase the daily work time H, because     
1
/ '' 0 H kc w H H t

          and
     
1 2 / ' '' 0. H t w H w H kc w H

              Note that (1) implies that Y0 does not affect H, which
is a useful property of the model because it implies that it should not be used as a control
variable (and can be used as an instrument in some specifications).
In a working paper version of this paper, we elaborate further on the effects of exogenous
changes in monetary commuting costs kc and commuting time t on the optimally chosen number
of days D and total labour supply DH (Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2009). It is
shown that workers may react quite differently to an increase in monetary commuting costs than
to a decrease in wages (in contrast to studies that assume that these effects are identical). We
demonstrate that an increase in commuting time decreases D, whereas the effect of a change in t
on total labour supply DH turns out to be ambiguous. The effect of monetary costs on D and DH
are also ambiguous, because the income effect of an increase in monetary costs may, or may not,
dominate the substitution effect.
Here, we focus on the case that speed is exogenously given, so a change in commuting9
distance implies an equivalent increase in commuting time. Hence, we assume that t = d/s, where
speed s is given. This case allows us to understand the overall effect of distance on labour supply
when workers face a constant commuting speed. The overall effect of distance on labour supply
involves then effects through increases in commuting time and monetary costs. This is relevant
as in our empirical analysis, we observe commuting distance, but are not able to distinguish
between the effect of commuting time and monetary costs separately.
In Appendix A, it is shown that an increase in distance increases H, but the effects on D
and DH are ambiguous.
9 The ambiguity on DH, as well as on D, is due to two reasons. First, any
increase  in  monetary  costs  (associated  with  an  increase  in  distance)  has an  income  and  a
substitution effect, and it is, a priori, unclear which effect dominates. Second, as we have seen
above, any increase in commuting time (associated with an increase in distance) will reduce D,
so DH is ambiguous.
We  are  also  interested  in  the  effect  of  a  marginal  increase  in  commuting distance  on
workdays and daily work time, keeping total labour supply DH constant. This allows us to
examine the behaviour of workers that are constrained to keep total labour supply constant.
Constraints by employers, collective bargain agreements, as well as by European Union labour
laws  are  quite  common  and  have  been  well  documented.
10 One  view  may  be  that  these
restrictions are only short-run restrictions for workers, but it is equally possible that workers see
these restrictions as permanent. Conditional on DH, the theoretical result that distance increases
H implies that distance decreases D.
Rather  obviously,  conditional  on  total  labour  supply,  it  is  true
that       0, H D k D H k       so, log( ) log( ) . D k H k      Hence,  in  the  empirical
application, when we control for total labour supply, it is not only convenient to use logarithms
9 Note that we obtain unambiguous results of distance on daily labour supply assuming that speed is given, but the
same (qualitative) results can be obtained when it is assumed that speed depends on distance and that commuting
time non-negatively depends on commuting distance. Empirically, this holds as the elasticity of commuting time
with respect to commuting distance is 0.5. For a full discussion, see van Ommeren and Fosgerau (2009).
10 For example, in the Netherlands, civil servants may choose from a flexible supply pattern keeping total labour
supply constant (e.g. work four days per week at nine hours per day, or work four days at eight hours and one day at
four hours).10
of D and H, but, given a correct specification of the model, it is arbitrary to use log H or log D as
the dependent variable. We will focus on log(H), as for this variable it is easy to find a variable
to instrument the endogenous explanatory variable DH.
3. Labour Supply Analysis
3.1. The data
Our empirical study is based on information from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
for the years 1997−2007. The  GSOEP  data  is  a  very  well  known  dataset  used  by  many
researchers (e.g. Hamermesh, 1996; Bell and Freeman, 2001). For details of the GSOEP data,
see Haisken-DeNew and Joachim (2005). For each year, we have information on commuting
distance as well as on labour supply per week, and for eight out of eleven years we also have
information  on daily hours  and workdays  per  week.  For  the years  1998,  2001  and  2003,
information on daily hours and workdays per week is missing.
11 For the years 1997, 1999 and
2000, information about the commuting distance is only available if the workplace municipality
differs from the residence municipality, so the exact commuting distance is unknown for workers
who commute to a workplace location within the residence municipality. This is unproblematic
as distances of workers who live and work in the same municipality do not vary much. Hence,
for these years, we have imputed a value of 5 km for workers who live and work in the same
municipality.
12
3.2. Selection of sample and descriptive statistics
We focus on samples of employees aged between 20 and 60 working outside their house (in
order to exclude extreme outliers, the sample is restricted to those workers who work at least two
hours per day and maximally 100 per week). On average, each employee is observed three times.
11 Note that the number of workdays is not necessary the same as the number of days the worker commutes. We
have only data of number of workdays per week.
12 A sensitivity analysis shows that the results presented later on are insensitive to the imputed value (e.g. 0 or 6
km). This makes sense as the imputation refers to only 26% of the observations, and the difference between the
(unobserved) distance and the imputed distance is small (less than 10% of the mean commuting distance).11
The data includes demographic information on age, gender, workplace region, net hourly wage,
net household monthly earnings, household members and children. Data on elapsed residence
duration and job change allow us to identify changes of residence and job, and therefore allows
us to construct residence and job fixed effects for each worker.
13 Data on workhours per week
refer to all hours worked, including overtime. Information on firms is limited (e.g. size, industry)
and will not be used in our analysis, because we use job fixed effects. In our data, we have
information  about  the  number  of  days  usually  worked  per  week for  workers  for  whom  the
number of workdays per week is fixed (so it does not change from week to week). This applies
to 73% of all observations. The analyses are based on a dataset of 41,611 annual observations for
11,749 employees. Our analysis of number of days and daily hours is restricted to workers for
whom the number of workdays is per week fixed. This may potentially bias the results, as we
have a selected sample. Arguably, this bias can be ignored because of two reasons. First, we will
make use of a workers’ fixed-effects approach. Using this approach and given the assumption
that the coefficient to be estimated are the same for workers’ with or without flexible workweeks
(while allowing for worker heterogeneity with respect to number of workdays), selectivity bias is
absent. Second, even if the coefficients to be estimated differ between workers, then the bias will
be (negligibly) small, as the selected sample covers the large majority of workers. For the results
shown, we will treat the number of days as a continuous variable, but treating the number of days
as  a  discrete  variable  (e.g.  4, 5  or  6  days)  generates  identical  results.  Worker  changes  in
workdays are quite common. In our data, on average, each year about 10% of workers change
their number of workdays.
The mean one-way daily commuting distance for all workers in the period of analysis is
15.3 km, in line with a range of other studies. Consistent with studies that show that the average
commuting distance increases over time, we find that, on average, commuting distance increases
0.1  km  per  year.  Table  1  shows  descriptively  the  relationship  between workers’  changes in
13 In a previous version of this paper, we did not control for job change (but only for employer changes). We thank
an anonymous referee for the suggested improvement.12
labour supply and commuting distance when we keep residence location and job constant, which
we will later argue is the relevant measure to deal with the endogeneity of distance. For example,
when the annual change in commuting distance exceeds 5 km, the average number of workdays
per week decreases by 0.2% whereas the number of daily hours increases by 1.5% and weekly
hours increase by 1.4%. This strongly suggests that daily and weekly labour supply increase with
distance.
In Appendix B, Table B1 shows patterns of workhours per day and workdays for the years
that these data are available. 85% of the workers work exactly five days per week, which seems
clearly the ‘norm’. Only 8% of the workers work more than five days and only 7% less than five
days. These percentages suggest that either employers restrict the number of workdays or there is
little variation in preferences of workers.
14 In contrast, there seems to be much more variation in
workhours  per  day.  For  example,  only  40%  of  all  workers  work  exactly  eight  hours. This
suggests that the fundamental assumption made by studies such as Parry and Bento (2001) and
Calthrop (2001) that the number of workdays is optimally chosen whereas the daily hours are
fixed may be less appropriate, at least for Germany. It appears also that there is large difference
in the distribution of workdays and daily hours between males and females, which suggests that
the effect of commuting costs on labour supply may potentially differ by gender.
The  correlation  coefficient  between  days  and  daily  hours  is 0.22  (see  Table  2).  The
correlation between daily hours and weekly hours is positive and significant at 0.005 level, and
much larger  than  the  correlation  between  days  and  weekly  hours  at  0.005  level.  These
correlations suggest that variation in the daily hours is more important than variation in days in
determining  variation  in  weekly  labour  supply.  These  results  are  in  line  with  the  results  of
Hamermesh (1996).
14 In Germany, labour supply has become slightly more flexible over time: the proportion of individuals working
exactly five days has fallen over time (86% in 1997 vs. 83% in 2007). As the drop is only slight, this seems to justify
our procedure to pool the data for the different years. This slight drop is in line with the observation that Germany
seems to be moving towards a more flexible labour market (Hamermesh, 1996; Ostner et al., 2003).13
3.3. Econometric model
In  our  empirical  application we  aim  to  investigate  whether  changes  in  commuting  distance
influence labour supply patterns, measured by weekly labour supply, number of workdays and
daily hours. Let Zit denote either weekly labour supply, number of workdays or daily hours for a
worker i in a specific residence and with a specific job in year t, so i refers to a specific worker-
residence-job combination. Defining worker i in this way will be useful to address endogeneity
of commuting distance. Following the labour supply literature (see e.g. Borjas, 1980; Costa,
2000; Bell and Freeman, 2001), we assume a double-log labour supply specification:
0 1 it 2 log log , it it i it Z k X u          (2)
where α1 is the elasticity of labour supply Zit with commuting distance kit, the matrix Xit includes
time-varying controls for household characteristics (e.g. children) and work characteristics (e.g.
net hourly wage rate), which are assumed to be exogenous factors, uit is the overall error, and εi
is unobserved heterogeneity, which captures unobserved time-invariant characteristics that are
specific  to a worker-residence-job  combination.  For  example,  these characteristics may  be
unobserved worker-specific preferences with respect to Z (e.g. a preference for leisure time), or
they may  be unobserved residence-specific  characteristics  (e.g.  residence  location)  or job-
specific characteristics that affect Z (e.g. nurse). The particular definition of worker i implies that
when a worker changes from residence i to residence i’, then εi ≠ εi’. The same holds for changes
in jobs (also when staying with the same employer). We treat εi as a fixed parameter and estimate
all models in terms of first-differences, that is, variables are formulated as changes from one time
period to another. Taking first-differences essentially removes εi from expression (2) and implies
that:
          1 1 1 2 1 log log log log , it it it it it it it Z Z k k X X v                (3)14
where 1. it it it v u u    Consistent estimation of α1 requires that the change in commuting distance,
    1 log log it it k k   , is exogenous to     1 log log it it Z Z   and therefore not related to vit. This is
usually not the case, since a change in the workers’ commuting distance may be the result of an
endogenously chosen residence or job move. However, in (3), the change in distance may only
be the result of an exogenous workplace relocation. The latter type of relocation can be argued to
be exogenous because a change in distance keeping the same job implies that the firm has moved
the worker (workers are not able to move workplace location keeping the same job). In (3), only
within-workers’ variation in variables for each worker given the same residence and the same
job is employed in the estimation procedure. Thus, the effect of distance on     1 log log it it Z Z  
relates purely to changes in commuting distance for a given residence and a given job, so that
reverse causation is eliminated, and α1 provides a consistent estimate of the effect of commuting
distance on labour supply.
15 Keeping the workers’ residence and job constant as we do, any
observed  change  in  a  worker’s  commuting  distance  must  be  employer-induced  (due  to  a
workplace relocation while staying with the same firm) or may also be due to measurement
error.
The idea to use firm relocation as a source of exogenous change in commuting distance is
also exploited in Zax (1991) and Zax and Kain (1996). Firm relocations are quite common and
are therefore a useful source of variation in commuting distance. For example, about 7–8% of
firms in the Netherlands are each year involved in relocation decisions (Weltevreden et al.,
2007). In Great Britain, in each year 0.5% of workers state that they change residence because of
an employer-induced workplace move, suggesting that workplace moves are quite important, as
only a (small) proportion of workers would move residence given a workplace move (National
Statistics, 2002). Note that in the GSOEP survey analysed here, there is no information whether
15 The estimation of a worker-residence-job first-differences model is similar to an estimation of (3) on a selective
sample of workers who do not change of residence and stay with the same job. Information of workers after they
have changed residence or job is then not employed, which makes the latter estimation method less efficient.15
firms  move.  However,  by  keeping  job  and  residence  given,  we  infer  that  all  changes  in
commuting distance are caused by a (exogenous) change in commuting distance as a result of a
relocation of the workplace by the firm.
16
By  including  residence  and  job  fixed  effects,  we  essentially  estimate  average  local
treatment effects for workers who face a change in their commuting distance as their employer
moves their workplace location in a certain period, but who do not move job or residence during
this period. Hence, strictly speaking we do not identify the average treatment effect for the whole
population of workers and this effect may differ of the effect identified. The generality of our
results therefore seems to depend on the effect of commuting distance on the rate of job and
residence relocations and on the frequency of job and residential moves. It appears that the
literature on the effect of commuting distance on residential and job mobility indicates that there
is a positive effect, but this effect is rather weak (see, for example, van Ommeren et al., 1997;
1999; for a review, see van Ommeren, 2004). Furthermore, it appears that German job and
residence moving rates are low (and even lower than other European countries), implying that
the large majority of workers would not move job or residence within the period the workplace
relocation takes place. Hence, it is plausible that the effect identified will also hold for the whole
population.
Note further that measurement error in reported distance may be important in our set up.
17
In particular, it is quite common that workers report a small change in commuting distance. So,
for example, one year they report 63 km and next year a distance of 62 km. The change in
distance is then maybe due to measurement error. In our data, 51% of all observations (when we
keep residence and job constant) indicate a change in commuting distance, but the proportion
drops to 10.2% when we consider changes in distance that exceed 5 km. These changes are much
less likely due to measurement error. This suggests that in our data, about 25% of changes in
16 One objection to our identification strategy is that the observed change in commuting is maybe not exogenous for
top managers, who may be able to shift their workplace location while keeping the same job. As there are only few
of those workers in our sample, we can safely exclude this case.
17 If measurement error is white noise, it implies that our results are biased towards zero and therefore conservative
(so, the true values are larger in magnitude).16
commuting distance are employer-induced, whereas the other changes are due to endogenous
residence and job moves. Note that measurement error may be quite frequent, but the size of the
error will be small relative to the average commuting distance. Since we include the logarithm of
commuting  distance  in  the  analysis,  the  (downward)  bias  in  our  estimates  is  likely  small.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that our estimates may be conservative.
We will now discuss the specification of the wage rate that must be included as a control
variable in (3) according to theory. Net hourly wage rates are calculated by dividing net monthly
earnings by monthly hours. Such a calculation introduces a form of measurement error, known
as ‘division bias’, because measurement error in hours enters both the left and right hand-sight of
(3). This results in a spurious negative correlation between hours and the wage rate (Stewart and
Swaffield, 1997; Lee, 2001), because overreporting of hours would lead to an underreporting of
the  hourly wage  rate.
18 So,  we  calculate the wage  rate  using contractual  hours  instead  of
observed  hours,  because  the division  bias  in  hourly  wage  rates  using contractual  hours  is
substantially less than using observed hours.
Another problem with estimating the wage elasticity in (3) is, according to some studies,
the endogeneity of earnings, because of uncontrolled wealth effects (e.g. the arrival of new
information about the wage rate may also lead to a revision in expected lifetime wealth, which is
captured by the error term vit; see MaCurdy, 1981; Altonji, 1986).
19 A valid estimation of the
wage elasticity, taking these two sources of endogeneity into account, is to instrument changes in
the wage rate. Economic theory suggests that human capital variables, such as age, which are
correlated with wage growth, are candidates to be used as instruments (e.g. Lee, 2001). We
instrument the change in wage rate using age and its square.
20 These instruments are frequently
used in the labour supply literature and are frequently claimed to be exogenous with respect to
18 The importance of wage division bias has been widely documented in the labour supply literature (e.g. Borjas,
1979; Abowd and Card, 1989; Lee, 2001; French, 2004).
19 Workers are assumed to be wage-takers in the standard theoretical framework (given competitive labour markets),
and in our model the function w(H) is exogenously given. Of course, if the market is not competitive this result does
not hold, which may be another reason to instrument wage
20 A non-linear specification of age is appropriate, because one expects that older individuals are less likely to
receive a wage increase, but one expects this effect to decrease after a certain age.17
change in labour supply (see e.g. MaCurdy, 1981; Lee, 2001).
21 As shown in Table B2, these
instruments are strong.
22
Note however that some studies argue that changes in worker preferences for labour supply
are related to age, in which case age is invalid as an instrumental variable for wage rate in
estimating  (3).  Consequently,  the  estimated  wage  elasticity  is  likely  to  be  downward  bias
(Altonji, 1986). For our main results that focus on the effect of distance, it appears that criticism
regarding the validity of the instruments is less relevant, because, as we will show later on, it that
turns  out  not to be  necessary  to  control  for  wages  in  estimating  the  commuting  distance
elasticity. This is in line with studies that show that the correlation between commuting distance
and wages is low (e.g. Manning, 2003).
3.4. Empirical results
The econometric results of all models taking first-differences in line with (3) are shown in Table
3.
23 We emphasize that in this way we control for worker, residence and job-fixed effects. Since
both the labour supply variable and commuting distance are in logarithmic form, the commuting
distance  elasticity  of  labour  supply  is  given  by  the  coefficient  of  the  commuting  distance
variable.
The first three columns of Table 3 show the results for weekly labour supply. The effect of
commuting  distance  on  weekly  labour  supply  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  (at  5%
level).  The  elasticity  estimate  is  0.009  (s.e.  0.002).  This  indicates,  for  example,  that  if  the
commuting distance increases from 20 to 40 kilometres, individuals increase labour supply by
about  15  minutes  per  week. We  consider  this  a  small  effect. Controlling  for time-varying
variables (columns 2 and 3) and whether wage is instrumented does not appear to be essential,
21 Further, note that we indirectly take into account the individual’s decision to participate or not in the labour
market, because we take differences for each employed individual.
22 The effect of our instruments of wage rate growth is as expected and is in line with the literature, as age has a
negative effect on wage growth (see Table B2). Although according static labour supply theory as used in this paper,
commuting distance should not be included as a control in the instrumentation of wage rate, job search theory
indicates that, generally, the wage rate will depend positively on commuting distance (Manning, 2003).
23 We have also estimated fixed-effects models (instead of first-differences models) and obtained similar results, but
the instrumentation of the wage is more complicated in that setting, so we prefer the first-differences results.18
because the estimated effect of commuting distance on weekly labour supply not controlling for
any other variable (column 1) generates almost identical results.
24
We have experimented with other specifications for commuting distance (e.g. controlling
for workplace location within the municipality of residence), but results are very similar. For
example, given a linear specification of distance, the point estimate is 0.0005 (s.e. 0.0001),
which corresponds to an elasticity of 0.008 (evaluated at the mean commuting distance of 15.3
km).  So,  essentially  the  same  results are  obtained as  given  a  logarithmic  specification  of
distance.
Our theoretical model assumes that labour supply patterns (hours and days worked) are
optimally chosen, which may not be true for every worker. For example, workers may face
restrictions  on  hours  and  days  worked  by  employers (e.g.  Ilmakunnas  and  Pudney,  1990;
Dickens and Lundberg, 1993; Stewart and Swaffield, 1997; Euwals and van Soest, 1999; for
Germany see e.g. Holst and Schupp, 1998; Wolf, 1998). These studies combine information on
preferred labour supply with information on observed hours to identify restrictions on hours. We
therefore have also analysed the effect of commuting distance on preferred weekly labour supply
(see Table 3). Preferred labour supply is the answer to the following question in the survey: “If
you could choose your own number of working hours, taking into account that your income
would change according to the number of hours, how many hours (per week) would you want to
work?”.
25 The effect of distance on preferred weekly labour supply is insignificant (0.003 with
an s.e. of 0.003).
26 We have also estimated the effect of commuting distance on the difference
between log preferred and log (reported) weekly labour supply. The estimate of distance on the
difference between preferred and (reported) labour supply is −0.006 (s.e. 0.003), consistent with
the  results  in  Table  3. This  suggests  that workers  react  stronger  to  changes  in  commuting
24 Other estimates are as expected: the individual’s labour supply decreases with other household income, having
children also brings out a negative effect on labour supply, especially by women. Our instruments in [2] are strongly
correlated with the endogenous variable change in wage; for example, the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for instrument
strength is large. As expected, if we do not instrument wage growth in [2] (so, we perform an OLS regression), the
estimate of net hourly wage is biased downwards.
25 Note that this question is slightly ambiguous for our purpose, because it may not specifically be related to the
current job.
26 For 29% of workers, preferred weekly labour supply is missing, and these observations have been excluded.19
distance  than  they  would  choose  without  employer  restrictions.  This  result  is  seemingly  a
paradox, but one explanation is that workers with long commutes prefer to leave later in the
evening, but are not allowed by employers to arrive later in the morning (or the opposite case),
hence they are ‘forced’ to work more hours per day.
Columns 7–14 of Table 3 show the results of commuting distance on number of workdays
and daily hours. In line with the theoretical model developed (and the descriptive statistics in
Table 1), we find a positive elasticity of daily hours with commuting distance (0.010 with an s.e.
of 0.002). This elasticity of daily hours with commuting distance is essentially the same as the
elasticity of weekly hours. Workers with long commute distances, ceteris paribus, appear to
increase the total labour supply mainly by increasing their daily labour supply. The theoretical
model  developed  offers  little  insight  into  the  expected  effect  of  commuting  distance  on
workdays. We estimate an insignificant elasticity of workdays with commuting distance (0.001
with an s.e. of 0.002).
Column 13 of Table 3 shows the results for workdays and daily hours controlling for
weekly labour supply. This is useful as an additional test of the theoretical model. One statistical
difficulty when controlling  for  weekly  labour  supply  is  the  possible  endogeneity  of  weekly
labour supply (as workers are likely heterogeneous in their preference for leisure time). We
therefore instrument the worker’s weekly labour supply with other household income, defined as
the total household income minus the worker’s own-labour income, (for the first step see Table
B3) and show the results in column 14 of Table 3.
27 This instrument is valid using the theoretical
model as discussed just after (1). We find that the estimate of commuting distance is 0.006 (s.e.
0.004), but just not significant at the 10% level.
We have also investigated whether it is useful to distinguish between male and female
workers, because it seems plausible that the effect of changes in commuting distance on labour
market  behaviour is  gender-specific (e.g. White,  1986; Singell  and  Lillydahl,  1986). It  is
27 According  to  (1),  we should  not  use  other  household  income  as  a  control  variable  for  the  daily  hours’
specification, so it is a valid instrument. We have tested for instrument strength using the Kleibergen-Paap test; the
instrument appears to be sufficiently strong.20
therefore not surprising that some studies of labour supply examine only female workers (Cogan,
1981)  or only  male  workers  (Dickens  and  Lundberg,  1993;  Stewart  and  Swaffield,  1997),
whether other studies look at the gender differences in labour supply (Hekman, 1980). Also our
descriptive statistics in Table B1 show that labour supply patterns differ strongly between males
and females. We have therefore re-estimated separate models for males and females. In Table 4,
the results when we do not control for wage can be found (other results are similar).
We  find  now  that the commuting  distance  elasticity  of  weekly  hours of  0.0035  (s.e.
0.0017) for male workers is much smaller than the one obtained for female workers of 0.015 (s.e.
0.003). The effects on daily labour supply are about the same. So, our estimates indicate that the
effect of commuting distance on labour supply patterns is stronger for female workers.
28 Note,
however, that the effect is still small for females. A doubling of commuting distance increases
weekly labour supply by 25 minutes per week for females, for males only 5 minutes. This is in
line with the labour supply literature where it is generally found that females are more sensitive
to the level of wages (see e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2007).
3.5. Sensitivity analysis
We  used  age  to  instrument  wage  rates  in  Table  3.  However,  one  may  argue  that  age  is
endogenous to labour supply patters, as older people may work a different amount of hours
because of lifecycle labour supply considerations. Workers between 25 and 50 years old likely
do not differ much in their intensive nor extensive labour supply. We have therefore re-estimated
models for this subsample of workers, but the estimate of commuting distance remains the same.
We have also re-estimated models excluding observations that most likely refer to measurement
error in the commuting distance (changes less than 2 km), but the results remain robust.
28 These results indicate that even in a sample of employed workers, there are still gender differences that play a role
in the workers’ reaction to changes in commuting costs. See similarly White (1986); Hersch and Stratton (1994).21
4. Conclusion
This paper analyses the effect of costs of commuting, measured by the commuting distance, on
labour supply patterns using the socio-economic panel data for Germany between 1997 and
2007. As far as we are aware, theoretical and empirical work that focuses on how daily hours
respond to changes in commuting distance is analysed here for the first time. We deal with the
endogeneity of commuting distance by means of a worker first-differences approach for a sample
of employer-induced changes in commuting distance (which are result of workplace relocation,
so we keep job and residence location constant). Although one may have intuitive feelings about
the effects of commuting distance on total labour supply, the theoretical model developed in this
paper demonstrates that empirical analysis is needed, as it is not clear what the direction of the
effect  is.  Nevertheless,  we  are  able  to  show  that theoretically  and  empirically distance
unambiguously increases daily labour supply.
The estimated positive effect of distance on daily labour supply is consistent with the
theoretical labour model developed. It is however also consistent with other explanations. One
other explanation may be that workers may reduce commuting costs by leaving earlier from
home or departing later from work in line with bottleneck economic models (Vickrey, 1969;
Arnott et al., 1993). When individuals leave earlier from home or depart later from work (e.g.
workers with fixed work schedules), they will increase labour supply, whereas the number of
workdays remains constant.
In the current paper, we have emphasized the importance of the assumptions regarding
modelled labour supply patters. In particular, how workers may choose their daily labour supply
as well as number of workdays are fundamental assumptions. Our empirical results show a slight
positive effect of commuting distance on weekly labour supply. The latter effect is the result of a
positive effect on daily working hours and a negligible effect on number of workdays. Hence,
one implication of our results is that when workers face changes in their commuting costs, they
are more likely to change the number of hours worked per day than the number of workdays.22
We find that the effect of commuting distance on overall labour supply is rather small, so
one other implication of our results is that when aiming to evaluate policies related to changes in
commuting  costs  (e.g.  regulation  of  housing  construction),  arguments  related  to  changes  in
labour supply patterns are likely not fundamental to the discussion to what extent these policies
affect welfare. Our empirical results seem therefore in contrast to assumptions in the literature
that analyse optimal road taxation given distortionary labour income taxation (see e.g. Parry and
Bento, 2001; Calthrop, 2001). Our results suggest that when introducing a road tax, a budget-
neutral  reduction  in  the  income  tax,  as  advocated in  the  literature  (Parry  and  Bento,  2001;
Mayeres and Proost, 2001), may not be necessary in order to increase welfare. Note however that
our results need to be interpreted with some caution, because we focus on employed workers
only  and  do  not  consider  the  effect  of  changes  in  commuting  costs/time  on  labour  market
participation.
29
As emphasised in the introduction, our empirical analysis may help us to understand long-
term developments in labour supply patterns. Our results suggest that increases in commuting
costs may have some effects on daily labour supply. This may help us to understand why in
countries such as the Netherlands workers have shifted from the eight hour workdays to nine
hour workdays. To what extend our results can explain different trends in labour supply over the
last two decades (e.g. in UK and US, labour supply has been rising, whereas in other countries it
has been falling), remains open to debate.
29 There are also other reasons why road pricing may have little effect on the participation decision. Female workers
with few working hours for whom the participation decision is strongest affected by economic incentives, do not
belong to the same group of workers who generally will face a road tax. Female workers with few hours of work are
less likely to travel by car and have shorter commuting distances if they travel by car, so this group will be hardly
affected by road pricing.23
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Table 1. Mean Employer-Induced Change in Commuting Distance (1997, 1999–2000, 2002, 2004–2007 GSOEP)
Change in commuting distance Δ km ≤ –5 │ Δ km│< 5 Δ km ≥ 5
Δ Daily hours –0.003 (0.166)   0.002 (0.140)   0.015 (0.166)
Δ Workdays 0.006 (0.146) –0.001 (0.111) –0.002 (0.110)
Δ Weekly hours –0.003 (0.218)   0.002 (0.172)   0.014 (0.210)
No. observations 1,341 16,563 1,499
Note: Daily hours, workdays per week and weekly labour supply in logarithm.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2. Correlations of Dimensions of Labour Supply (1997, 1999–2000, 2002, 2004–2007 GSOEP)
Daily hours Workdays per week
All workers (N= 19,403)
Workdays per week 0.218
Weekly hours 0.381 0.185
Male workers (N= 10,548)
Workdays per week 0.154
Weekly hours 0.258 0.083
Female workers (N= 8,855)
Workdays per week 0.156
Weekly hours 0.422 0.217
Notes: Pearson correlations; all correlations are significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed).29
Table 3. Estimates of Logarithm of Changes in Labour Supply with Changes in Commuting Distance (1997–2007 GSOEP)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS



































































































































































F (instr. wage) 168.92 73.13 97.65 98.00 97.65
F (instr. weekly hours) 12.822
No. observations 41,611 41,611 41,611 29,376 29,376 29,376 19,403 19,403 19,403 19,403 19,403 19,403 19,403
Notes: Year controls included. Weekly labour supply, preferred weekly labour supply, workdays per week, daily hours, commuting distance, net hourly wage rate and monthly net income of other
household members in logarithm. Note that for some workers information on preferred weekly labour supply is missing. F-test = Kleibergen-Paap weak identification test.
**,
*– indicate that estimates
are significantly different from zero at 0.05 and 0.10 level. Standard errors are in parentheses. Net hourly wage in columns [2], [5], [8], [11] and [13] is instrumented using the first step of Table B2;
weekly labour supply in column [13] is instrumented using the first step of Table B3.30
Table 4. Estimates of Logarithm of Changes in Labour Supply with Changes in Commuting Distance for Male and
Female Workers (1997–2007 GSOEP): OLS Approach




































































































































No. observations 22,445 16,033 10,548 10,548 19,166 13,343 8,855 8,855
Notes: Year  controls  included.  Weekly  labour  supply,  preferred  weekly  labour  supply,  workdays  per  week,  daily  hours,
commuting  distance  and  monthly  net  income  of  other  household  members  in  logarithm.
**,
* –  indicate  that  estimates  are
significantly different from zero at 0.05 and 0.10 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.31
Appendix A: Theoretical Model
A.1. First-Order Conditions
Using  standard  microeconomic  techniques  (see  e.g.  Varian,  1992),  we  derive  the  workers’
optimally chosen daily work time H and days D by maximising v, implying the following two
first-order conditions:
'( ) 0, Y L V w H D V D   (A1)
and
    ( ) 0. Y L V w H kc V H t     (A2)
The  first condition  (A1)  states  that  the worker’s  marginal  utility  of  leisure  time  equals  the
marginal opportunity cost of leisure time. The second condition (A2) states that the worker’s
marginal utility of working one day equals the marginal opportunity costs of working one day.
Equation (1) in the main text is obtained by combining (A1) and (A2).
A.2. Comparative Statics
We label F1 and F2 as the two first-order conditions (A1) and (A2) of the worker’s optimization
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The  sign  of  the  derivatives  follows  from  the  assumptions  regarding v  and w(H). The
determinant of M is positive, which implies a global maximum. We proceed now by using the
restriction that t = k/s, where s is exogenous (s > 0).
Partial  effects  are  usually  determined  based  on  Cramer’s  rule.  However,  the  effect  of
commuting distance k on workhours H is more easily determined by totally differentiating (1)
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where the inequality in this expression follows from the concavity of w(H). The denominator and
the  numerator  in  this  expression  is  negative,  so   / D k   is unambiguously  determined  and  is
positive.
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the signs of two out of four derivatives are ambiguous (because time and commuting costs have
opposite effects on F1 and F2).
The expression for   / D k    is complicated and not insightful, and can be received upon
request. However, it can be easily shown that the sign of  / D k   is indeterminate. For example, if33
only time costs of commuting exist (c = 0), the effect of k is equal to the partial effect of t, which
has a negative effect on D (see Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2009). However, if
only monetary costs exists (t = 0), the workers’ utility function is     log , v Y f L   so VYL=VLY
=0, VY=1/Y, VYY=–VY/Y, and kc is small relative to w(H), it can be easily shown that 2   / 0. F k   
Hence, an  increase  in  monetary  costs has  a  positive  effect  on D  (meaning  that  workhours
increase to compensate for the loss in income) so     0. DH k   34
Appendix B: Tables
Table B1. Distribution of Daily Hours and Workdays per Week (Percent) (1997, 1999–2000, 2002, 2004–2007
GSOEP)
Workdays per week
1–4 5 6–7 All days
Daily hours
Workers (N= 19,403)
Less than or equal to 4 h   1.5   4.0 0.5   6.1
More than 4 or less than 7 h   2.3   8.0 1.0 11.3
Exactly 7 or less than 8 h   0.9 14.0 1.0 15.9
Exactly 8 h   1.1 31.5 2.2 34.6
More than 8 or less than 10 h   0.7 18.3 1.3 20.4
Exactly or more than 10 h   0.4 9.0 2.3 11.7
All hours   7.1 84.8 8.1
Male workers (N= 10,548)
Less than or equal to 4 h   0.1   0.2   0.0   0.3
More than 4 or less than 7 h   0.2   1.0   0.3   1.5
Exactly 7 or less than 8 h   0.4 15.2   0.9 16.6
Exactly 8 h   0.4 37.3   2.6 40.3
More than 8 or less than 10 h   0.3 22.5   1.7 24.6
Exactly or more than 10 h   0.3 13.0   3.4 16.7
All hours   1.8 89.2   9.0
Female workers (N= 8,855)
Less than or equal to 4 h   3.2   8.6   1.0 12.9
More than 4 or less than 7 h   4.8 16.3   1.8 22.9
Exactly 7 or less than 8 h   1.6 12.5   1.1 15.2
Exactly 8 h   2.0 24.6   1.4 27.9
More than 8 or less than 10 h   1.2 13.3   0.8 15.3
Exactly or more than 10 h   0.6   4.3   0.9   5.8
All hours 13.4 79.6   7.0
Notes: Totals do not add to 100% because of rounding.
Table B2. First Step Results of the Logarithm of Changes in the Net Hourly Wage Rate IV Procedure (1997–2007
GSOEP)







2/100   0.017 (0.001)
**   0.016 (0.001)
**   0.017 (0.002)
**
Control factors
Change in commuting distance –0.002 (0.002) –0.000 (0.003) –0.005 (0.003)
Change in new state   0.004 (0.004)   0.002 (0.005)   0.005 (0.006)




Change in female × children –0.007 (0.006) 0.003 (0.008)
Change in child   0.018 (0.006)
**  0.023 (0.006)
**   0.003 (0.012)
Change in household members –0.003 (0.002) –0.002 (0.003) –0.005 (0.004)
No. observations 41,611 22,445 19,166
Notes: Year controls included. Commuting distance, weekly labour supply, net hourly wage rate and monthly net income of other
household members in logarithm.
  **,
* – indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 0.05 and 0.10 level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.35
Table B3. First Step Results of the Logarithm of Changes in Weekly Labour Supply IV Procedure (1997, 1999–
2000, 2002, 2004–2007 GSOEP)
Variables Workers
Instrument
Other household income/10 –0.047 (0.016)
**
Control factors
Change in commuting distance   0.012 (0.003)
**
Change in new state –0.021 (0.007)
**
Change in female × children –0.049 (0.006)
**
Change in child –0.025 (0.006)
**
Change in household members –0.003 (0.003)
No. observations 19,403
Notes: Year controls included. Commuting distance, weekly labour supply, net hourly wage rate and monthly net income of other
household members in logarithm.
**,
* – indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 0.05 and 0.10 level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.